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Abstract—This paper presents a unique solution for 
identification and verification of IoT devices. The solution is 
based on actual security threats in the IoT design. For this 
reason, the unique identification chip DS2401 is used and 
devices are monitored from the centralized system. The paper 
introduces this system for authentication and authorization of 
IoT devices. These functions use the unique identification 
number. The whole system, including the management of 
identities and the user server, is realized with Raspberry Pi 
devices. 
 
Index Terms—Internet of Things; IoT Security; 
Authorization and Authentication; DS2401; IoT Identification.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
A new era of the Internet of Things (IoT) brings a lot of 
advantages into the traditional networks, although it comes 
with some disadvantages. More and more devices can now be 
connected to the Internet and they can be therefore remotely 
controlled and managed. Moreover, these devices can 
communicate together to achieve smart functionality. These 
devices include smart refrigerators, TVs, and all kinds of 
smart sensors. Obviously, data from these devices contain 
very sensitive personal information about their users.  
The IoT field is a very dynamic field and it is getting into 
all aspects of life. The number of active IoT devices is rising 
exponentially and it corresponds to the Gartner estimation of 
6 billion connected IoT devices in 2016 [1]. Such a 
progressive increase will result in a large number of new 
types of attacks. Moreover, considering their constant usage, 
the level of security risks is higher than the other types of 
devices connected to the Internet. An attacker does not need 
to gain access to the system, but he/she can just simply use 
the read access to eavesdrop transmitted messages. A lot of 
devices are collecting some forms of personal information 
such as name, address, date of birth, or credit card numbers. 
This information, in combination with data from other sensor 
devices, can allow an attacker to predict users’ behavior and 
life habits. This knowledge can then be misused by social 
engineering methods of attacks. The security risk is further 
increased with the IoT devices connecting into the cloud 
services and using mobile applications. Many devices, 
connected to home networks, are sending data in unencrypted 
form [2]. This can be easily misused if the home network is 
not properly configured, or if it is using non-sufficient 
security mechanisms [3]. Hewlett-Packard conducted an 
analysis [3] of the vulnerability of IoT devices with the 
following results:   
• 90% of all IoT devices contain at least one personal 
information; 
• 70% of all IoT devices were using unencrypted 
network services; 
• 80% of IoT devices using cloud and mobile application 
components did not specify sufficient password 
requirements (complexity and length); 
• 70% of IoT devices allowed an attacker to identify 
valid user account via account enumeration, 
• 60% of devices using a user interface were vulnerable 
to large number of errors such as XSS (Cross-site 
scripting) and weak authentication.   
An attacker can use the vulnerabilities of IoT devices, such 
as weak passwords, unsecured password recovery 
procedures, or wrong setting of authentication mechanism for 
gaining access to the device. Most of the devices and their 
cloud and mobile application components do not require 
sufficient password complexity and length. This means that 
most of these devices are using trivial passwords, which can 
be predicted easily. The last alarming fact concerning security 
is a mechanism of software updates of IoT devices. More than 
60% of these devices are downloading such updates without 
using encrypted communication. The update files are 
typically not protected also. This makes it easy for an attacker 
to capture this communication, and to potentially manipulate 
with the update file. This file, containing modified software, 
can then be used by IoT devices without any suspicions. 
 
II. RISKS SECURITY 
 
Security in the IT field is a very broad topic and it covers 
many different subsections. In the case of IoT, the following 
security fields have to be considered: data, end devices, 
central devices, servers, databases, web services, 
communication, and networking infrastructure. The IoT field 
is very heterogeneous both in the possibilities of usage and 
the technologies used [4]. This results in complicated process 
of securing the IoT devices and dangerous impact of attacks. 
In the IoT deployed within smart homes, the security 
requirements are different than the production networks, or 
health care. An attacker attacking a smart home can, with a 
slight exaggeration, controls lighting, heating, and other 
appliances, which do not typically pose a significant threat (in 
the first phase). On the other hand, a similar attack in a 
production or health care network can have fatal 
consequences. The security is therefore a very important field 
for the IoT and it is influencing the usability and future 
development of IoT. Security requirements on IoT devices 
should, in the first place, include identification mechanisms 
and functions to ensure the integrity of users’ data, users’ 
privacy, authentication, and system trustfulness. Data 
security can then be divided into two layers: storage and 
communication. The current research in the IoT is mainly 
focused on the communication layer security [5-7]. A lot of 
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standard communication protocols are providing security on 
the higher level. The main problem of these protocols is the 
required hardware and software, which allow effective and 
secure running of the security algorithms. The IoT 
architecture is typical for its composition from several 
separated and isolated layers. Different rules and systems are 
used for setting up the communication between these layers. 
Each layer is defined by its functionality and type of devices 
used on this specific layer. Different models of architectures 
exist within the IoT field, but one of the mostly used, as stated 
in [3,8], is the four-layer architecture from Cisco, which is 
shown in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: Cisco IoT platform architecture 
 
The IoT architecture is specific for combining digital and 
physical worlds. This has severe consequences on security, 
such as making eavesdropping type of attacks much more 
serious. Consequently, well-known attacks can become new 
security threats on new devices that use new protocols and 
procedures. Many of the closed operating systems (SCADA, 
Modbus, CIP) are oriented as IP-based systems, making them 
much more prone to security issues. The IoT can be misused 
by different categories of security threats including: 
• Common worms and viruses from the ICT world.  
• Script kiddies and other attackers using: unsecured 
web cameras, data theft and intrusion into a smart 
home central system.  
• Cyber terrorism – attacks on nuclear power plants 
(virus Stuxnet [9]), electrical grid networks, 
monitoring systems of critical infrastructure (railway, 
transport). 
Although threats in the IoT can be the same as in the 
Internet [10-12], their impact can be completely different. For 
this reason, it is necessary to conduct an effective analysis of 
threats and their solutions in the IoT area. One of the most 
basic principles for ensuring security in the IoT is to identify 
a mechanism that can verify it. Many IoT devices have 
insufficient computation performance and low memory to 
support standard authentication protocols. Most commonly 
used authentication protocols, including AES (Advanced 
Encryption Suite) and RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman), use 
strong encryption methods and are therefore computationally 
too demanding for the IoT devices. For this reason, 
authentication and authorization of the IoT devices must be 
conducted using much more efficient methods. Another 
security elements are placement and level of data protection, 
strong identification, improvement of other networking 
protocols (DNS, DNSEC, DHCP), and acceptance of latency-
tolerant protocols. Many of the IoT use cases are considering 
encryption. However, IoT end devices and sensors are 
typically used within a long timeframe (20 years); therefore, 
it is important to consider long-term security of the 
encryption protocol. Identity management can increase 
security of the IoT by combining different authentication 
methods of users and devices. Protection of privacy and 
privacy compliance are connected to each other and the extent 
of connection is regulated by appropriate countries and 
regulations. With the rapid development of these 
technologies, users have to be aware of the influence of these 
issues on their lives. 
         
A. Security Recommendations  
The IoT security is a very important and challenging area 
for both developers and attackers. The following part 
describes the basic requirements on IoT security. These 
requirements are based on conducted analysis of security 
threats and attacks. The requirements can be met only if the 
security is included in the initial development phase. Today, 
there is no general solution that is able to solve all the IoT 
security problems [13]. Security requirements have to be 
considered with security failures, risk levels, and various 
types of attacks. Further, the cost of implementing proper 
security mechanisms has to be considered. The basic 
functions that should be considered are [14,15]: 
• Secure launch – this can be achieved by 
cryptographically signed code from the vendor. The 
mechanism has to include hardware support of code 
verification for the code validity check. This will 
ensure that the firmware is not modified and is 
therefore secure.  
• Secured updates – similarly to the secure launch, 
secured updates can be achieved with the signed code, 
eliminating the option of code tampering.  
• Data security – it can be achieved by preventing 
unauthorized access to the device and by encrypting 
storage and communication.  
• Verification – unauthorized access to the devices can 
be mitigated by methods consisting identity 
verification with strong password authentication, or 
using of protocols like X.509 or 802.11.X. 
• Protection from attacks – a critical part of this layer of 
security is a firewall. A firewall can allow 
communication only for known and trusted hosts, 
while simultaneously block attackers before an attack 
is launched. It is necessary to ensure protection from 
common attacks (packet flood attacks, buffer 
overflow, and exploits – misuse of protocols’ bugs).  
• Detection and monitoring – current embedded devices 
can be attacked without notice of legitimate users. An 
attacker can send millions of login attempts without 
any record of such an activity. This can present a 
critical security flaw if the devices do not require 
strong authentication passwords (as mentioned in the 
HP research [3]). Embedded devices therefore have to 
be able to detect and notify invalid login attempts and 
other threats. 
• Integrated security message – integration of a system 
for security control, which can set different security 
policies is important. By modifying these policies in 
real-time, security threats can be mitigated. 
 
A key factor for the IoT security is authentication and 
authorization – or with additional accounting the AAA 
architecture. These methods are used for identification of IoT 
devices, for the following verification of their privileges, and 
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finally, for monitoring. 
a. Authentication in the IoT 
Authentication is used to uniquely distinguish and identify 
subjects within IoT network. These subjects can be embedded 
devices, sensors, actuators, or endpoints. Verification of 
device trustworthiness is done via authentication. The way of 
storing and presenting identity information in the IoT can be 
different from the traditional networks (which use usernames 
and passwords, tokens, or biometric data). In the IoT, end 
devices, in most cases, do not need any human interaction. It 
is highly encouraged that such devices can identify 
themselves. For such a task, radiofrequency identification 
(RFID), shared secret key, X.509 protocol, certificates, or 
hardware based authentication methods (for example based 
on MAC address) can be used [16]. 
 
b. Authorization in the IoT 
Authorization is a process of verification access privileges 
of IoT devices into the IoT infrastructure. This process 
typically follows successful authentication and based on the 
identity, certain privileges are granted. The main task of 
authorization is therefore to verify, if the device has the 
privilege to conduct a specific action (such as inserting a new 
entry into the database). A challenge in this area is to create 
an architecture that is able to handle millions of devices with 
different level of trustworthiness [17]. 
 
c. Accounting in the IoT 
This part of the AAA architecture is not dealing with 
security, but with log-in. Accounting is used for managing 
networking services and resources used by end devices. This 
information can be important for management, planning, and 
for preventing certain types of attacks. It is, for example, 
possible to track, which device tried to verify itself, when, and 
the result. For the AAA purposes, architecture with 
traditional computer networks, TACACS+ or 802.1x with 
RADIUS can be used in the IoT.     
 
 
III. THE INTELLIGENT SYSTEM OF IOT AUTHENTICATION 
 
Our solution of the intelligent system of IoT authentication 
was tested in the environment of a home network, but the 
logical model can be implemented in industrial IoT networks 
as well. The main reasons for implementing in a home 
network were the availability of technologies and the fact that 
such environment is more vulnerable to security threats. The 
industrial IoT networks are managed by IT specialists using 
company’s security policies, processes and procedures, 
which make these networks more secure.  
The system handles device authentication and 
identification. This is done by a single centralized entity. The 
system also contains a web server, database, and uses 
communication filtering. The advantage of this 
implementation is embedding it in the usage of available 
technologies, hence it is applicable to wide public use. As a 
communication network, Wi-Fi was chosen due to its typical 
usage in most home networks. If necessary, the 
communication network can be adjusted to Zigbee or LoRa 
without the need to modify the system (only a change of the 
specific hardware is required). IPv4 was used for addressing 
this issue due to its wide usage in home networks. IPv6 
however, can be used and it is fully supported by the system. 
The communication topology is shown in Figure 2.  
 
IoT devices
IoT devices
IoT devices
Wlan0: 192.168.1.10
ISP
wlan0: 192.168.1.1
eth0: 192.168.0.7
Figure 2: Communication topology 
 
A. The Logical Model of the Authentication System 
The main idea of the logical model is to assign a unique 
identification number to every element of the IoT network 
and to use this number for verification. This can be achieved 
with the integrated circuit DS2401. To mitigate a risk of 
eavesdropping and MitM attacks, the whole communication 
has to be encrypted. This means that firstly, a secure channel 
between an IoT device and the central element has to be 
established. Only after a successful verification, full 
communication can be enabled. OpenSSL library and TLS 
1.2 cryptographic protocol are used for the encryption. In this 
case, two key pairs are used. Each of the server and a client 
has their own key pair. For the encrypted communication, a 
client does not need to be verified. Authentication of the IoT 
device over the unique number is conducted in the following 
five steps (shown in Figure 3):  
• Before the authentication process can start, a secured 
communication using SSL/TLS is established. The 
secured communication could be established using 
certificates, but such a solution would require a unique 
certificate for each device. Our solution, on the other 
hand, assigns the same certificate for every device. 
This certificate only confirms that the device belongs 
to the network. Verification itself is then realized over 
the unique number.  
• Authentication is initiated by the client sending an 
authentication request (“auth”).  
• The server processes the request and replies with its 
ID. The client receives the ID and verifies, if the server 
is the valid one. If the verification is successful, the 
client sends its ID to the server.  
• The server verifies the client’s ID in its database. If the 
ID exists, the server checks, if that device is allowed 
to communicate. If it is, the device is verified with the 
0x123 message; otherwise, the communication is 
rejected with the 0x987 message. 
• After the successful verification, the client can use the 
encrypted communication with the server on port 
1111. 
 
IoT devices
Server
the creation of secure communications
the requirement for authentication „auth“
sending server ID
sending client ID
the result of verification
data
client.c server.c
int authentication (SSL *ssl, int sockfd) int authentication (SSL *ssl, cennection_t conn)
int secure_comm_SSL (char **argv, char *data) void * process (void *ptr)
 
 
Figure 3: The authentication process 
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B. The Implementation of the Authentication System 
As already mentioned, the IoT devices have relatively low 
computational performance. This is reflected in our 
authentication system. For this reason, we have chosen 
adequate devices for the system’s implementation. The 
control entity was built using Raspberry Pi 2 platform. This 
device is responsible for controlling the authentication, 
providing a web user interface, and maintaining a database 
(with IoT devices, their status, and a list of users allowed to 
enter the control system). As a testing device requesting an 
authentication, older Raspberry Pi B model was used. The 
unique 48bit identification value was generated by the 
DS2401 integrated circuit. This solution has main benefits, 
such as its cheap cost and ease of use. The DS2401 contains 
the unique 64-Bit ROM ID chip for identification. This 
number includes 48bit serial number, 8bit CRC control 
checksum, and 8bit family code (this code determines the 
type of integrated circuit and its function). Another advantage 
is the use of 1-Wire bus, allowing the use of multiple DS2401 
circuits on a single data line. The bus can communicate up to 
16,3 kbps and reduce the control, addressing, and data 
transfer into a single pin connector. The power supply is 
provided on the data pin as well, reducing the need for 
external power supply [17]. For connecting the Raspberry Pi, 
GPIO was used. GPIO contains drivers for several interfaces 
and they are stored as core modules available via a modprobe 
command. This command can load appropriate modules into 
the linux kernel, if needed. This eliminates the need for 
programming a new reading method for DS2401 circuit. To 
set up the GPIO, the configuration file /boot/config.txt has to 
be modified as follows (added lines at the end of the file):    
 
#GPIO 
dtoverlay=w1-gpio,gpiopin=4 
 
Modules are loaded with the sudo modprobe command 
(wire, w1-gpio, and w1-smem). After the system is restarted, 
the name and unique ID of the connected DS2401 can be 
found in the file /sys/bus/devices/. If any of the circuits are 
connected, a folder with a unique ID is created (using format 
of: 01-xxxxxxxxxxxx). The first two numbers state the family 
code (01 for the DS2401). After the dash, the unique 48bit 
code follows. This code is read by the get_id.h header file. 
For the device management, a simple database containing 
the three following tables was created:   
• Device – contains information about devices 
(identification number, MAC address, name of the 
device, and status – allowed / denied).  
• Accounting – allows basic login functionality (status 
of verification, and device unique ID, name, MAC 
address, IP address, data, time, and status).  
• Users – stores users’ login credentials for application 
access (password is stored in SHA256 hash format). 
Because the logging information has to be archived, there 
is no relationship between the accounting and device tables. 
Authentication server realized on Raspberry Pi device is 
providing the following services: webserver, DHCP server, 
database, and access point (AP). Daemon hostapd is used for 
the AP functionality (the wireless interface has to be 
supported by the nl80211 driver). The complete wireless 
setting is stored in the file: /etc/hostapd/hostapd.conf. An 
additional security was achieved by using a firewall – with 
the iptables tool. The standard security policy of denying 
everything by default, was used (only the necessary 
communication is allowed). For the system control, web 
application was developed using the Bootstrap framework. 
This application allows to monitor the state of stored devices, 
their IDs, MAC addresses, names, and authentication state. 
The IoT authentication can be controlled by allowing or 
disabling devices access. Each device can be verified, if it is 
connected, by sending a ping message. The traffic of each 
device can be further controlled by editing traffic rules. This 
includes communication inside and outside the local network, 
and communication with the authentication server (on port 
1111). Default policy is to drop everything. 
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
 
The most critical features of every unique identification, as 
stated in [19], are uniqueness, reliability, persistence, and 
scalability. The existing approaches of IoT device 
identification are insufficient. The most common 
identification methods – via IPv4 or IPv6 addresses – are 
unable to identify specific devices within a group of 
cohabiting sensors, and have problems with the confluence of 
data from heterogeneous nodes. Although the IPv6 represents 
a great approach for unique identification with scalability in 
mind (due to its 128-bit long address), it has considerable 
requirements on end devices performance. This can be a 
problem with low-performance IoT devices like sensors. For 
this reason, lightweight IPv6 alternatives are being 
developed.    
The second approach for unique identification is the 
Uniform Resource Name (URN) with number addressing, 
which can be combined with URL (easily accessible via name 
addressing) and URC (controllable). This approach offers a 
hierarchical addressing, including specific gateways. On the 
other hand, it requires special implementation on network 
nodes.  
Both of these methods use only the logical addressing, 
which can be easily spoofed. The third approach is to use 
physical addresses (MAC), which can be more difficult to 
modify. However, they can still be spoofed relatively easily 
because these addresses are verified in software and sent in 
an unencrypted format,  
Unlike the previously mentioned, our implemented 
approach, adds a security layer with advanced authentication. 
The unique authentication is implemented with the usage of 
the integrated circuit DS2401, and secured protocol, ensuring 
the confidentiality of the unique number. Moreover, our 
system can be combined with all the previously mentioned 
identification methods, or be used as a standalone solution.           
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper presents a unique solution for enhancing IoT 
security via identification of devices. The solution 
corresponds to the fact, that there is no single optimal system 
for securing the whole IoT. The IoT field is very complex and 
dynamic in its nature, so there is a demand for implementing 
new applications for enhancing its security. The implemented 
system was tested in LAN of a typical home network, but can 
be applied into larger scenarios, including production 
networks. The unique 48bit number, issued by integrated 
circuit DS2401, was used for device verification. This 
verification process can be compared to the verification over 
MAC address. The main advantage of our verification 
process, in comparison to MAC address verification, is the 
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fact, that the unique number will stay hidden – it is transferred 
via a secured channel. The communication between the 
devices and authentication server is realized via a socket 
layer. Multiple devices can be verified at once because the 
server is using thread programming – a new thread is created 
for each connection. This thread is then responsible for the 
device verification and communication. The process of 
verification is logged and stored in a database. Lastly, a 
responsive web interface was developed for controlling 
access and monitoring of the IoT devices. 
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